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89th Congress }

House Report No. 1225

### REPORT OF

HON. WAYNE L. HAYS, Ohio
CHAIRMAN OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON STATE DEPARTMENT
ORGANIZATION AND FOREIGN OPERATIONS OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

ON A

### SPECIAL STUDY MISSION

TO INSPECT THE FOREIGN SERVICE BUILDINGS PROGRAMS IN TOKYO, JAPAN; HONG KONG; SAIGON, VIETNAM; BANGKOK, THAILAND; AND WELLINGTON, NEW ZEALAND

COMBINED WITH A REPORT OF

### OBSERVATIONS ON VIETNAM

AND A REPORT ON ATTENDANCE AS CHAIRMAN OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES DELEGATION TO THE

## ELEVENTH COMMONWEALTH PARLIAMENTARY CONFERENCE

HELD AT WELLINGTON, NEW ZEALAND, NOVEMBER 30-DECEMBER 8, 1965

### Pursuant to H. Res. 84

A Resolution Authorizing the Committee on Foreign Affairs to Conduct Thorough Studies and Investigations of All Matters Coming Within the Jurisdiction of Such Committee

AND

### Pursuant to H. Res. 418

A Resolution Authorizing the Speaker of the House of Representatives to Appoint a Delegation to Attend the Eleventh Commonwealth

Parliamentary Conference



January 25, 1966.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed

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WASHINGTON: 1966

### **FOREWORD**

House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Washington, D.C., January 25, 1966.

This report has been submitted to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

This report has been submitted to the Committee on Foreign Affairs by the Honorable Wayne L. Hays, chairman of the Subcommittee on State Department Organization and Foreign Operations.

During the last session of Congress, Representative Hays was appointed by the Speaker to serve as chairman of the House of Representatives delegation to the Eleventh Commonwealth Parliamentary Conference in Wellington, New Zealand. This report includes information developed by Representative Hays on the foreign service buildings programs in countries he visited en route to Wellington, including his comments on the buildings program as well as the situation in Vietnam, and the Conference in Wellington.

The findings in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the membership of the full Committee on Foreign Affairs.

on Foreign Affairs.

THOMAS E. MORGAN, Chairman.

#### LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Washington, D.C., January 10, 1966.

Hon. Thomas E. Morgan, Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Chairman: There is transmitted herewith a report on the mission to the Far East which I recently undertook while en route to the Eleventh Commonwealth Parliamentary Conference in Wellington, New Zealand.

It proved possible to make a first-hand inspection of our foreign service buildings facilities in Tokyo, Hong Kong, Saigon, Bangkok, and Wellington. This report contains my observations and comments on the foreign service buildings programs in those cities as well as on the situation in Vietnam and the Conference in Wellington.

WAYNE L. HAYS, Chairman, Subcommittee on State Department Organization and Foreign Operations; Chairman, House of Representatives Delegation to the Eleventh Commonwealth Parliamentary Conference.

14

### CONTENTS

Management of the Control of the Con
Foreword
Letter of transmittal
Introduction
Foreign Service buildings programs:
Tokyo, Japan:
Staff housing
Office space
Recommendations
Hong Kong:
Staff housing
Recommendations
Saigon, Vietnam:
Saigon chancery (office building)
Recommendations
Bangkok, Thailand:
Office space and staff housing requirements
Recommendations
Wellington, New Zealand:
Embassy office and residence
Recommendations
Vietnam:
Observations
Conclusions
Eleventh Commonwealth Parliamentary Conference, Wellington, New
Zealand

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FOREIGN SERVICE BUILDINGS PROGRAMS, OBSERVATIONS ON VIETNAM, AND 11TH COMMONWEALTH PARLIAMENTARY CONFERENCE

January 25, 1966.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed

Mr. Hays, from the Committee on Foreign Affairs submitted the following

REPORT ON A SPECIAL STUDY MISSION TO INSPECT FOREIGN SERVICE BUILDINGS PROGRAMS IN VARIOUS COUNTRIES COMBINED WITH A REPORT ON VIETNAM AND A REPORT ON THE 11TH COMMONWEALTH PARLIAMENTARY CONFERENCE

[Pursuant to H. Res. 84, a resolution authorizing the committee on Foreign Affairs to conduct thorough studies and investigations of all matters coming within the jurisdiction of such committee and pursuant to H. Res. 418, a resolution authorizing the Speaker of the House of Representatives to appoint a delegation to attend the 11th Commonwealth Parliamentary Conference]

VII

INTRODUCTION Last November and December, I undertook a mission to the Far East in the dual capacity of a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, inspecting and checking on certain aspects of the Foreign Service buildings program, and that of chairman of the House of Representatives delegation to the Eleventh Commonwealth Parliamentary Conference, held in Wellington, New Zealand.

During the last session of the Congress the Subcommittee on State

Department Organization and Foreign Operations began hearings on State Department proposals for construction of new embassy office and staff apartment buildings. Some of these were at posts which could conveniently be visited en route to the Conference at Wellington.

The on-the-spot check developed that while some of the proposals were sound and should be carried through in the interest of economy and efficiency, at least one major project required further study, and a number, particularly in the field of staff housing proposals, should be eliminated altogether. My observations and recommendations are submitted in detail in this report.

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The visit to Vietnam was a rewarding experience, although not a happy one. It could not be otherwise in a country in which American men are fighting to help a peace-loving people in their struggle against vicious and terroristic aggression. I shall always feel indebted to the many fine officers and men, both civilian and military, who proved eager to furnish information that would help me to know exactly what we are up against in Vietnam and what is being done about it. I am proud of their high morale and of their accomplishments. I left Vietnam determined to urge that we step up our efforts to end the war by doing more to cut the supply lines of the Communist

aggressors and by bombing and blockading Haiphong.

The Conference in New Zealand proved both useful as well as extremely interesting. It brought together many delegates from all parts of the globe, many of them from former colonial areas which have recently acquired sovereign status. It was helpful to hear them exchange views on their problems during the Conference sessions. Just as helpful, if not more so, were the many smaller and personal exchanges of views that constantly took place between individuals

and small groups between the formal meetings of the Conference.

At each of the posts visited, I was briefed on the work of the U.S. mission and the current situation in the area. These briefings were invariably of a high order and I was very favorably impressed by the caliber of most of the Foreign Service officers with whom I came in contact. The exceptions were few and far between. I was particularly impressed by the understanding of their responsibilities and their ability in discharging them avidenced by a problem. ability in discharging them evidenced by our able Ambassador and the Embassy staff in Wellington and by our consul general and his staff in Hong Kong. I have seldom participated in briefing sessions as ably conducted as those arranged for us in those two cities. I wish also to express my appreciation to Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge

and to Gen. W. C. Westmoreland and the members of their staffs for their assistance in Vietnam. I am particularly indebted to General Westmoreland for letting us have the benefit of participating in one of his evening staff briefings in which reports were received from every sector.

It is hoped that the comments and recommendations in this report will prove useful not only to the Subcommittee on State Department Organization and Foreign Operations, but also to members of the full

committee.

WAYNE L. HAYS,
Chairman, Subcommittee on State Department Organization and
Foreign Operations; Chairman, House of Representatives
Delegation to the Eleventh Commonwealth Parliamentary Conference.

### FOREIGN SERVICE BUILDINGS PROGRAMS

TOKYO, JAPAN

Staff housing

Over the years members of the Foreign Affairs Committee have increasingly expressed their concern over a trend in some countries to herd American employees together in compounds or apartments in such fashion as to insulate them from effective daily contact with the people of the country. Staff housing in Tokyo illustrated the worst in this trend observed on the trip.

Some of the blame for this condition must be placed on lack of foresight on the part of those responsible for the Foreign Service buildings program. Property values in Tokyo have skyrocketed in recent years and individual house and apartment rentals are almost unbelievably high. If housing needs had been properly anticipated and sufficient property acquired in scattered locations when values were low, we would not have the ghetto situation which presently plagues us in Tokyo. Present remedial action is complicated by prohibitively high real estate values. Many apartments observed by the study mission rent for as much as \$500 to \$1,000 monthly.

The United States owns 11½ acres in downtown Tokyo known as the Mitani site. Although purchased in 1950 for \$127,083, the ground

the Mitsui site. Although purchased in 1950 for \$127,083, the ground alone is now estimated to be worth \$20 million. On this site we had 2 alone is now estimated to be worth \$20 million. On this site we had 2 apartment buildings: Perry House, with 58 apartments, built in 1952 for \$758,851; and Harris House, with 24 apartments, built in 1953 for \$706,324. A third apartment building, Grew House, with 48 apartments, was added to this site in 1965. Construction of Grew House was financed through the sale of the Nonomiya apartment building for \$5 million (original cost about one-third of a million dollars), making a net gain to the United States of slightly less than \$3 million. Nonomiya had 35 apartments, so that only 13 units were gained by the construction of Grew House.

Of the 58 apartments in Perry House, 32 are small efficiency apartments which, the study mission was informed, had been designed originally to be sixteen 1-bedroom units. The administrative section of the Embassy wishes to convert these efficiency units into one-bedroom suites for unmarried staff members and to construct still another apartment building in addition to the three now located on the Mitsui site. During hearings last year, before the Subcommittee on State Department Organization and Foreign Operations, State Department witnesses testified that \$40,000 was being requested for the design of a building for 30 staff apartments and that in 1968 \$840,000 would be asked for its construction. The Department witnesses have not been agreement on requirements to meat staff housing needs in Tokyo in agreement on requirements to meet staff housing needs in Tokyo. One Department witness testified that-

properties for our housing should be built in separate parts of town so that the people can mingle with the people of other nations and get friendly. I don't believe in a ghetto proposition. We have three apartments there now. It is downtown. There is no question in my mind that the property can be sold and

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we can build buildings in another part of the city at a much lower price and save money for our Government.

This same witness told the subcommittee that constructing the three buildings in the middle of the area had "kind of ruined the rest of the property."

Office space

The present chancery is located on 3.2 acres adjacent to the Embassy residence in downtown Tokyo. In addition to the chancery building there are two attractive apartment buildings, one of which has been partly converted to office use. These buildings, constructed in 1931, are no longer adequate and Embassy operations are scattered in four buildings. The Embassy annex, known as the Mantetsu Building, located a short distance from the chancery compound, contains 124,642 square feet and houses part of the administrative section and portions of the political section, as well as the USIS, the military attachés and a number of other U.S. Government agencies. This building and land were purchased in 1952 for \$827,000. The property is currently valued at \$8 to \$9 million. The Embassy proposes to sell the Mantetsu Building and use the proceeds to demolish the buildings in the chancery compound and construct an office building with 300,000 square feet of floor space. The study mission was advised that such a building would cost about \$6 million. It would contain parking facilities and eliminate the need for the present motor pool site. We inspected this site, which cost the United States \$489.44 in 1928 for the land and which is now valued at approximately \$1 million.

### Recommendations

The study mission felt that justification for construction at this time of a fourth apartment building on the Mitsui site has not been adequately shown. The conflicting views of those who favor the "compound" approach to staff housing requirements in Tokyo and those who advocate dispersal of housing point to a need for more thorough study and consideration by the subcommittee before funds are authorized for such construction. A better case is made for construction of a new and larger chancery, but even here the need should be carefully weighed against the present and continuing usefulness of the existing buildings and their condition. They appeared to be in much better condition and to have had better maintenance than Perry House and Harris House at the Mitsui site. It would seem that there is nothing to be gained by hasty action, and it is recommended that the question of all new construction, both for staff housing and office space in Tokyo, be deferred until the subcommittee has had an opportunity to consider all the factors and recommend the best course designed to provide needed essential facilities at minimum cost to the taxpayers.

### Hong Kong

Staff housing

Prior to my undertaking the study mission, the subcommittee had been advised that the Foreign Buildings Office had scheduled in its authorization budget \$20,000 in fiscal year 1967 for development, and \$363,000 in fiscal year 1968 for construction of 18 staff apartments. It was proposed to build these on one or more sites presently owned by the United States on which single houses are located. The sub-

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committee had also been informed that a contract was soon to be awarded for the construction of a third floor extension on the present

U.S.-owned office building.

These proposed staff housing authorizations are not in accord with the requirements in Hong Kong as observed by the study mission. It was learned that while apartments had been scarce in the past, with property values high, new construction throughout most of the island had reached a saturation point and a plentiful supply of apartments

at reasonable rentals is now available.

In Hong Kong the government collects a 17 percent "rate" on all private leases. For this reason, the consulate executes short-term Government leases for U.S. employees. If the cost of rent and utilities exceeds that available to the employee, there is an out-of-pocket expense for the individual. This apparently was not a hardship. The study mission was told that a Foreign Service officer entitled to a housing allowance of \$3,800 for example, who would have an apartment renting for \$3,500, with utilities costing \$400, would be out of pocket only \$100. In many cases apartments with utilities are leased within the quarters allowance limitation. If a saving results, it accrues to the U.S. Government and not to the officer. The study mission inspected a number of apartments and was very favorably impressed by their construction and convenience of location. Conferences and discussions with the consulate staff indicated

Conferences and discussions with the consulate staff indicated that considerable funds could be saved over the long run if the consulate general was authorized to purchase a few apartments for long-range requirements. It was suggested that a property used as an officer residence at 44 Braga Circuit in Kowloon could be sold to generate funds for apartment purchases. This is the only U.S.-owned property in Kowloon; all other U.S.-owned properties are

located on Hong Kong Island.

### Recommendations

It is strongly recommended that no funds be authorized for the construction of an apartment building in Hong Kong. Investigation by the study mission clearly showed that there is no need for it. If there are to be U.S. Government-owned apartments, it would be preferable to purchase several in various buildings and avoid the compound or ghetto effect. The construction of the third floor extension on the present U.S.-owned office building appears to be warranted and funds are already available for that purpose.

#### VIETNAM

Saigon chancery (office building)

On April 1, 1965, the President requested enactment of legislation to authorize the construction of a new building in Saigon to replace a leased structure we had been using as a U.S. Embassy office and which had been damaged by a Vietcong bomb earlier in the week. The bill was introduced and reported by the subcommittee the same day, clearing the full committee the following day and passing the House by a vote of 378 to 0 on April 5. In his message, the President explained his request for prompt authorization in the following words:

This new building will be one more symbol of our solidarity with the people of Vietnam. It will show them that the United States has no intention of aban-

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doning them in the face of Communist terrorism and aggression. It will show them that we intend to live up to our commitments.

This new building will also show the Communists in Hanoi and their tools in the Victoring that wanton murder of civilians and destruction of civilian property cannot deflect us from our stated purposes in Vietnam.

cannot deflect us from our stated purposes in Vietnam.

To emphasize this determination and resolve, I request the Congress to act

promptly on this bill.

The subcommittee was told by State Department witnesses that construction would be rushed on a minimal structure, stripped to essentials, and without the elevators or an auditorium which had been tentatively included in earlier made plans for a structure to meet our Embassy office requirements in Saigon. The new building was to be constructed on 3.17 acres already owned by the United States on which are located four quonset-type temporary buildings which had been converted into office space. In reply to questions by the subcommittee, the witnesses indicated that the building would be "in business 6 months after construction started." The subcommittee was given reason to believe that Seabees and Army Engineers would be used to expedite construction.

Arriving in Saigon more than 6 months later, the study mission was shocked to observe that instead of having a building "in business" or nearly ready for occupancy, the foundations were not even complete, and the work on the skeletal structure had hardly begun. Instead of a crash program, using the skills of the Seabees and the Army Engineers, the entire job had been turned over to private contractors and no work was actually seen in progress when we inspected the premises. It is realized that extreme difficulty was experienced in quickly adapting and modifying existing building plans to meet the cost limitations and more spartan specifications, but the study mission could only conclude that there had been undue delays in getting started and that failure to utilize military and naval construction crews and facilities were largely responsible.

### Recommendations

The building now under construction will not be large enough to meet our needs and we will still have to rent some office space in Saigon. The desired impact has been largely lost by the delays in construction. The best way now to provide this "symbol of our solidarity with the people of Vietnam" would be to have enough additional delay to change the building plans and provide funds for a building that will prove fully adequate. Eventual economy can best be served by doing the job right while it is being done and adding additional stories for more space will better carry out the intent expressed by the President and the Congress last year.

### BANGKOK, THAILAND

Office space and staff housing reguirements

Last fall the subcommittee was informed that to meet increased office space requirements for our Embassy and for the USIS in Bangkok, \$500,000 had been programed in fiscal year 1966 for construction of an expansion of the Embassy office building. The new addition is to contain approximately 35,000 square feet and would be sufficient to accommodate the increased needs of the Embassy as well as provide adequate and more efficient quarters for the U.S. Information Agency.

The cost could be more than offset by sale of the property presently used by the Agency, which is valued at \$900,000; \$35,000 has also

been programed for construction of Marine guard quarters.

The Foreign Buildings Office has also included in the authorization budget \$10,000 for development in fiscal year 1967 and \$240,000 in fiscal year 1968 for the construction of staff apartments in the Peurifoy compound, in which 24 apartments are already located. As justification for spending \$250,000 for new staff apartments, the subcommittee was told that low-salaried personnel found it difficult to locate accommodations within their quarters allowance limitations. It was added that "the proposed apartment building will afford the degree of security and protection for single women for which the Embassy is responsible and which it is now unable to provide."

#### Recommendations

The study mission visited each of the U.S.-owned properties in Bangkok and concurs in the need for enlargement of the Embassy office building, the sale of the property presently used by the USIS, and the construction of Marine guard quarters. The proposal to construct another staff apartment in the Peurifoy compound is another indication of the tendency to isolate Americans in ghettos. Bangkok is a large and modern city in a country which has always been our friend. Inquiry by the mission showed that need for special protection for women employees is imaginary and without foundation. Evidence was received from many sources that living accommodations were available at reasonable rates. We learned, in fact, that young women employees had been moving out of the Peurifoy compound apartments and moving into the local economy as recently as the week of our arrival. The study mission opposes the expenditure of a quarter of a million dollars for an additional apartment building as an unwarranted and completely unnecessary expense.

### WELLINGTON, NEW ZEALAND

Embassy office and residence

The Offices of the Embassy are located in leased quarters on the seventh floor of an eight-floor office building. They are crowded and quite insufficient to accommodate all U.S. personnel, and the Defense attachés lease space elsewhere. There is no space for conference rooms and special equipment. There is a great shortage of office space in Wellington and additional space in the same building cannot be obtained. Common walls with other tenants preclude installation of a number of security and communication devices which would otherwise be furnished the Embassy.

The Foreign Buildings Office has programed in its authorization budget \$35,000 for development costs in 1967 and \$550,000 in fiscal

year 1958 for construction of an office building.

Negotiations have been underway with the New Zealand Government to obtain a site for an office building, plus a new site for the Ambassador's residence. The State Department has instructed the Embassy to proceed with negotiations leading to the acquisition of seven parcels which will comprise the site for the new office building. The cost will be funded from proceeds realized from the New Zealand Government's taking of our properties on which are presently located the Embassy residence and the Marine guard quarters for a freeway.

6 REPORT OF HON. WAYNE L. HAYS, OHIO

A new residence must be obtained before December 1966. Suitable residence sites are very scarce in Wellington and it has been recommended that the Foreign Buildings Office purchase an improved property and renovate it as an interim residence.

The study mission inspected two alternate proposed houses and was most favorably impressed with one in the Lower Hutt area which would require only minor alterations to become suitable as an interim residence.

Recommendations

The study mission feels it is important to proceed with present plans for construction of an adequate office building for the Embassy in Wellington. It is also recommended that the property in the Lower Hutt area be acquired as an interim residence and that an option be taken on a desirable site (inspected by the mission) offered by the city upon which to later build a permanent residence. It is anticipated that the interim residence could then be sold at a profit.

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#### VIETNAM

#### OBSERVATIONS

As a member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs which has special legislative responsibilities relating to our operations in Vietnam, I felt obligated to visit that country while in the area en route to New Zealand. There had been some implications in the press that a large influx of visitors to Vietnam was placing a burden on American officials there. I had some diffidence about imposing on the time of our officials who are conducting our military and economic programs under conditions and limitations of active warfare, but these same officials made me glad that I went. Our military and Embassy officials did not share the view mentioned in some press articles. On the contrary, they welcomed opportunities to have officials from Washington see just what we are up against and what we are doing about Their cooperation left nothing to be desired. A single exception was the apparent attitude of the chief of our AID mission in Saigon, with whom a conference had been scheduled. On arriving in Vietnam we found this meeting had been canceled. No information on our economic aid program was furnished us by any of our foreign aid officials in Vietnam. (On our return we were informed this was due to a communication failure; that the meeting was supposed to have been rescheduled for the purpose of providing us with information.) From what we learned indirectly, there are such serious shortcomings in the whole economic assistance program in Vietnam as to make imperative a thorough investigation and reevaluation of our aid efforts

During my brief stay our military and Embassy officials made it possible for me to gain an insight of the situation in Vietnam that no number of briefings in Washington could possibly provide. The difficulties under which our men are fighting defy the imagination and have to be seen to be understood. The first afternoon was spent inspecting our Foreign Service building facilities, followed by a small and informal evening conference with Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Counselor of Embassy John E. Bacon, and some of our mission leaders. We spent the next day making a field trip. After an early morning briefing with Maj. Gen. John N. Ewbank at Military Assistance Command Headquarters, we were enabled, by the use of helicopters, to visit and inspect a number of active posts in the field outside of Saigon. Our schedule was:

<sup>7:30</sup> a.m.: Discussion and briefing with Maj. Gen. John N. Ewbank, USAF, at Military Assistance Command Headquarters, Saigon.
9:15 a.m.: Briefing with Lt. Gen. Joseph H. Moore, USAF, commander of 2d Air Division, and Col. E. F. Witzenburger, USAF, at Tan Son Nhut Airbase.
10:40 a.m.: Briefing at 1st Infantry Division Headquarters, Di An, with Brigadier General Dickens assistant division commander.

General Dickens, assistant division commander.

11:15 a.m.: Visit and lunch with Colonel Brodbeck, commander of 3d Brigade, lst Infantry Division, at Lai Khe. (Tour by jeep of outposts at rubber planta-

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1:15 p.m.: Discussion and briefing with Colonel Atteberry, commander of divi-

sion artillery, 1st Infantry Division, at Phu Lai. 2:15 p.m.: Briefing with Col. Albert Milloy at 2d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, at Bien Hoa.

3:15 p.m.: Visit and briefing with Major Downs at 3d Mobile Surgical Hospital. 5:30 p.m.: Briefing with Gen. W. C. Westmoreland at Military Assistance Command Headquarters.

On our third and final day in Vietnam we flew to Vung Tau where an impressive and apparently effective training program is being conducted by American authorities. It is a civilian program designed to help the Vietnamese people at the local levels to maintain their freedom and counter Communist aggression and terrorism.

About 12 million of the 14 million South Vietnamese live in the countryside and are mainly farmers or fishermen. Outside of the provincial capitals and the few major towns, the rural population is scattered about in groups ranging from a few families to several score of households whose people have traditionally lived near each

In seeking to dominate and control this rural population, the Vietcong have used murder, abduction, threats, propaganda, and all of the classic forms of Communist terrorism. In the past, lack of forces to defend them, and promises which the Government had not always been able to keep, had diminished or destroyed faith and confidence in local authorities and left little if any motivation to actively oppose the aggressive terrorism of the Vietcong. This situation played into Vietcong hands as to a great extent guerrillas live off the population among whom they fight.

One of the Vietnamese district leaders devised a system to fight the Vietcong infiltrators on the local levels and over the past year much attention has been given to reversing the situation in the local villages and hamlets. In a number of Provinces, Vietnamese authorities are raising teams of men native to the district and they are being trained at Vung Tau to carry on Government work. This being trained at Vung Tau to carry on Government work. This work consists of civic action projects, including repairing paths, thatching roofs, cleaning wells, and helping with harvests. Their work is attuned to the needs of the rural families and their field of activities is limited to their own general localities.

After training, these local teams are given full assistance by our own AID representatives in the form of fertilizer, building equipment, schoolbooks, etc. Our USIA representatives provide posters, educational tracts, and factual information concerning Vietnamese Government programs underway to assist the people, which the teams pass on to good advantage.

While these teams are primarily civilian, and have basically a civilian function to perform in the field of political and civic action, they are fully trained and heavily armed and equipped in order to protect themselves and the families among whom they circulate.

We were informed that where these teams have been established and are functioning, they have been significantly effective in arming the rural population to resist the Vietcong. This has improved cooperation with local authorities in many instances and has helped provide the means for gaining information on Vietcong movements in time to act effectively. It is helping to separate the Vietcong guerillas from the people and to dry up their sources of supply and information, increasing their isolation and their vulnerability.

Because this program really seems to reach and meet local needs it was one of the most encouraging aspects of the situation we witnessed during our stay. Since the program began in July of 1964, almost 300 teams of 40 men each have received training and are functioning against the Vietcong in their own home areas. About 3,500 volunteers are presently being trained at Vung Tau, with substantial numbers

coming in monthly

There are severe limitations on the amount of information that can be obtained by spending just 3 days in Vietnam. However, when added to years in Washington during which countless hours have been spent in committee hearings, conferences, and executive session briefings on the subject, three such sharply compacted days can contribute a vital degree of additional knowledge and understanding. I wish to express my deepest appreciation to the many men and officers who

did their best to make our visit as productive as possible in this sense.

This is a cruel and vicious war being waged by the Vietcong with outside help against a people who would like nothing better than to be left alone. We are determined to do our utmost to help the South Vietnamese bring it to a speedy end. To wage aggressive and unjust war is a senseless barbarism and it is a sobering and unhappy experience to witness wounded soldiers being brought in for emergency treatment in a field hospital as we did on our field trip. Unstinted praise is due the devoted doctors and nurses who care for them. Praise is also due those responsible for supplying them with the best equipment medical science can provide. Even in the tent hospital facilities in the field, we were informed, lives can be saved under conditions that would have been considered impossible or miraculous just a few years ago.

One of the strongest impressions gained was a sense of the splendid morale of our men and those fighting with them, including those from Australia, New Zealand, and South Korea. We did not visit Vietnamese military posts in our short stay, but the testimony of our officers, as well as their heavy casualty lists, are eloquent proof of

their dedicated bravery in combat.

### Conclusions

My observations in Vietnam confirmed indications and evidence I had received in Washington that there are additional steps we must take to hasten the end of the war. Attempts to keep the conflict within certain limitations could indefinitely prolong the struggle and encourage the aggressors by misleading them about our intentions. Our forbearance has been misunderstood by the calculating leaders in Hanoi. A vociferous minority here at home has also contributed their share in causing the Communist aggressors to doubt the credibility of our determination. It has not helped our cause for several misguided Americans to visit Hanoi and give their own false interpretation of our efforts.

I support the President's peace drive 100 percent. I devoutly hope it will succeed, but I fear the aggressors may continue the fight because they believe we are tired of the struggle and are just seeking any excuse to get out of it. If they were wise and better informed, they would realize that this is just what we cannot do without utterly destroying the credibility of all our mutual security commitments

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around the world. Some misguided few have been responsible for the mistaken hopes of the Vietcong leaders and if they persist in rejecting peace, we have no acceptable alternative to staying in Vietnam "as long as aggression commands us to battle."

If continued aggression does require us to remain in Vietnam I am convinced that we should immediately increase our efforts. We should discard our inhibitions about increasing the number of military targets for bombing. The usefulness of Haiphong as a port should be destroyed by bombing. With Americans dying in combat, it just does not make sense to me to permit all sorts of supplies to reach the aggressors without doing our utmost to prevent it. This means a very great increase in our bombing missions and the extension of their targets to a major degree. Restraint will encourage the Vietcong to doubt our resolve to honor our pledge to help the South Vietnamese and will encourage them to prolong the conflict.

### ELEVENTH COMMONWEALTH PARLIAMENTARY CONFER-ENCE, WELLINGTON, NEW ZEALAND

In March 1965, on behalf of the New Zealand branch of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, the Honorable W. B. Tennent, chairman of the General Council of the Association, extended invitations for the Senate and the House of Representatives to send four Members to attend the Eleventh Conference to be held in Wellington, New Zealand, in December 1965. The United States is not a member of the Association, but such invitations have been extended for many years and U.S. delegates have attended in the capacity of

On June 10, 1965, the House of Representatives unanimously approved a resolution (H. Res. 418) authorizing the Speaker to appoint four Members of the House as a delegation to attend the Conference. Pursuant to this authority the Speaker, on July 7, appointed the following Members:

Hon. Wayne L. Hays, Ohio, chairman. Hon. Thomas E. Morgan, Pennsylvania. Hon. Frances P. Bolton, Ohio.

Hon, E. Ross Adair, Indiana.

Under authority of a similar Senate resolution, the Vice President appointed the following Senators:

Hon. J. W. Fulbright, Arkansas, chairman.

Hon. Bourke B. Hickenlooper, Iowa. Hon. Frank E. Moss, Utah. Hon. Hiram L. Fong, Hawaii.

The chairmen of the House and Senate delegations designated Mr. Boyd Crawford, staff administrator of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and Mr. Seth Tillman, consultant to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, as secretaries of the respective delegations. The Commonwealth Parliamentary Association was established in

1911 at the time of the coronation of King George V and was originally known as the Empire Parliamentary Association. Over the years, the structure and organization of the Association have been modified to meet the shift of members from colonial to sovereign status.

There were only six branches of the Association when it was founded in 1911. Its worth and usefulness as machinery for consultation and exchange of ideas is shown by the fact that the Association now has

more than 90 member branches and meets every year.

The Conference was formally opened at Parliament House, in Wellington, on Tuesday, November 30, by His Excellency Sir Bernard Fergusson, the Governor General of New Zealand, and closed on December 8. The Conference agenda included the following subjects:

I. Rhodesia (two sessions).

II. Economic growth in the Commonwealth (three sessions).

(1) The effective use of technical and financial resources for economic development.

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(2) Problems of commodity stabilization.

(3) Agricultural cooperation.
(4) The growth of population in relation to resources. III. Parliamentary government in the Commonwealth (two ses-

(1) Differing party systems.

(2) The redress of grievances: the Office of Ombudsman. IV. The Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, its future role and development (two sessions).

V. International Affairs (three sessions).

(1) The United Nations.

(2) Southeast Asia.

(3) Africa.

The formal sessions were all of interest. Some were characterized by debate notable for frank and even unrestrained critical comment. Just as interesting, and perhaps of equal or even greater importance, were the innumerable opportunities afforded for candid and personal discussions among the delegates. Such exchanges of views and opinions were stimulating and of great mutual benefit. These informal discussions with individuals and small groups, in the anterooms and other meeting places, alone would have made the trip worthwhile. The subjects covered ran the gamut of world problems and afforded an excellent opportunity to explain many facets of U.S. foreign policy as well as to counter some criticisms that had been based on incomplete facts. This was a two-way procedure which I am sure helped us better to understand many of the problems facing

the leaders of the Commonwealth member governments.

Attending the 11th Commonwealth Parliamentary Association Conference in Wellington was a rewarding experience and it is hoped that invitations will be extended for the U.S. Congress to send delegations as observers to future meetings. We shall always have most pleasant memories of the gracious welcome and hospitality of our hosts, the New Zealand branch, the officials of the Conference, and the officials of the Government of New Zealand it was our privilege

to meet.